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Time was when you would rather be sued almost any place but Texas.

That

particular worm appears to have made a U-ey.2 In today’s Texas, no breach of contract,
no matter how egregious, can be more than a breach of a contract.3 There is no such thing
as a contort4 in Texas. Unfortunately, that may not be the case in Arkansas or Oklahoma.
During last year’s Natural Resources Law Institute, we discussed the contort
phenomenon in the context of Seeco, Inc. v. Hales.5 Really, though, it didn’t matter in

Hales whether the class’ theory was tort, contract or both. All damages awarded were
1Member, Daily & W oods, P.L.L.C., Attorneys at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.

2
3 Actually, it took Texas some time to get to where it got. In Pan American Pet. v.
Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. - W aco 1963), the Texas Court of Appeals actually
affirmed an award of punitive damages in an implied covenant to prevent drainage case.
However, a more conservative Texas Supreme Court has since established that if the
damage would not have occurred without the breach of some contract, the case could be
brought only in contract. See Dewitt County Electric Coop. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex.
1999); Southwestern Bell v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991); Southwestern Bell
v. Delanney, 809 SW2d 493 (Tex. 1991); Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d
563 (Tex. 1981)
4When we use the word “contort” we mean a breach of contract, usually intentional,
which a clever plaintiff's lawyer (the “contortionist”) is able to convert into a tort (frequently
fraud).
5 341 Ark. 673, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).

based upon actual underpayments of royalty, plus interest on those underpayments.
Moreover, all of the Hales defendants were corporate affiliates of one another, proven to
have been alter egos.
This year’s leading contort case is Bridenstine v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Company6 The
facts are complicated. Beginning in 1978, and continuing throughout the early 1980's, a
company called Funk Exploration, Inc., drilled and operated numerous gas wells in Beaver
and Texas Counties, Oklahoma. Those wells were connected to a gathering system built
by a Funk affiliate, Funk Fuels Corporation. Another affiliate, Funk Liquids Corporation,
built a gas plant to remove liquids from the gas.

Almost from the beginning, Funk

Exploration paid Funk Fuels a 45¢ per MCF gathering fee.

In addition, Funk paid a

“marketing fee” to a company called Encon. All these fees were deducted prior to payment
of royalties by Funk.
By 1985 the Funk companies were in severe financial trouble. W hether for that
reason or otherwise, they all changed their names during that year.

Each became a

Waterford Company.
Also, in order to raise cash, the Funk/Waterford entities sold a major position in the
wells and the Beaver Pipeline to Ladd Petroleum Corporation. Over the years, through
corporate changes, Ladd turned into Amax Oil & Gas, Inc., Union Pacific Oil & Gas
Company, Universal Resources Corporation and, finally, various subsidiaries of Questar
Corporation.
Meanwhile,

Funk/Waterford

took

bankruptcy.

Kaiser-Francis

6Texas County, Oklahoma, District Court Case No. CJ-2000-1.
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bought the

Funk/Waterford entities out of the bankruptcy and merged them into Kaiser-Francis.
Throughout the 1980's and the 1990's, the producing companies, whatever their
names, continued to deduct 45¢ per MCF for gathering, as well as a “marketing fee.” At
the end, Kaiser-Francis was paying that marketing fee to Texas Southwest Gas
Corporation which, by then, had become a subsidiary of Kaiser-Francis. By the end of
1994, Kaiser-Francis had become the operator of most of the wells.
In 1995, the Bridenstines filed suit on behalf of themselves and a putative class of
royalty owners against Kaiser-Francis, Union Pacific Oil & Gas Company, Universal
Resources Company (Questar Exploration & Production Company) and Chase-Manhattan
Bank (which had benefitted from the liquidation of the Funk/Waterford companies and the
sale of their assets to Kaiser-Francis and the other defendants). All claims against all
defendants other than Kaiser-Francis were settled by those defendants in 2000 and early
2001, leaving Kaiser-Francis as the remaining defendant at the trial.
The class alleged that Kaiser-Francis and the settling defendants were jointly and
severally liable for non-payment of royalties on the gathering fees, the marketing fees, and
for gas lost through under measurement. The class’ theory was fraud.7 It claimed that
royalty check stubs and year-end statements "misrepresented” royalty owners’ shares of
the gas sale proceeds. The jury agreed. The verdict for actual damages against KaiserFrancis is $54,960,606.30.

In addition, the jury awarded punitive damages of

$18,803,446.85. Kaiser-Francis will almost certainly appeal. However, as we learned from

Hales, it is difficult to overturn a jury verdict.

7A tort, or contort.
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The contort aspect of Bridenstine is important for at least two reasons. First, and
most obvious, is punitive damages.

Punitive damages are not available in breach of

contract actions. On the other hand, if an intentional tort is committed, the jury has the
power to teach the defendant a lesson (and bestow a windfall upon the plaintiff) with
punitive damages. $18,803,446.85 is real money which would not have been awarded for
mere breach of contract.
Second, since these damages were caused by the commission of a tort, KaiserFrancis will be unable to obtain contribution from any of the other defendants, in spite of
the fact that those defendants appear to have carried off much of the allegedly ill-gotten
gain. Oklahoma’s statute concerning contribution among joint tortfeasors provides for a
reduction in liability to the extent of money paid by settling joint tortfeasors but, then, if
those joint tortfeasors settled in good faith, they are released from any duty to contribute
to the ultimate verdict.8 This statute applies only to contribution between joint tortfeasors,
since this legal justification for joint and several liability is based upon tort rather than
contract principles.
Incidentally, the contribution issue would have turned out differently in Arkansas,
which has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Under the Uniform
Act, a joint tortfeasor who settles is not discharged unless the release given him
proportionately releases all other tortfeasors.9

8 12 O.S. § 832(H).
9 A.C.A. §§ 16-61-204 & 205.

Page -4-

AOGC Reg ul a t io n o n Seismic Ac t ivit y Ha s Unint ended
Co nseq uenc e in Co l umbia Co unt y Ca se
The 1993 Arkansas General Assembly enacted Act No. 242 of that year,10
authorizing and directing the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (“AOGC” or
“Commission”) to regulate seismic exploration activities. The Commission responded with
Rule B-42. That rule provides, in part:
No entry shall be made by the permittee upon the lands upon which such
seismic operations are to be conducted, without the permittee having first
secured a permit from the landowner authorizing such operations to be
conducted.
The regulation does not expressly deal with a situation where a landowner refuses to grant
a permit despite the seismic operator’s contractual or common-law right of ingress and
egress to the lands in question.
In 1998, Sonat Exploration Company wanted to conduct seismic operations in
Columbia County on James Blanchard’s property. Sonat had lease rights to come on the
land but Mr. Blanchard refused access. Sonat then obtained a restraining order against
Mr. Blanchard so that it might exercise its lease rights.
Later, in the same consolidated case,11 the Court12 held that Sonat had trespassed
upon Mr. Blanchard’s land and was liable therefor. The Court’s reasoning was that Sonat
had violated Rule B-42 by not securing Mr. Blanchard’s permission and was thus a
trespasser. The case has not been fully adjudicated and so no appeal has yet been taken.
10A.C.A. § 15-71-114
11 Swift Energy Company and Blanchard, et. al. v. Sonat Exploration Company,
Columbia Circuit Case No. CIV 98-137-5.
12 The Honorable Larry Chandler.
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It is submitted that the AOGC has no authority to require landowner permission
under circumstances where a seismic operator already has a legal right to come upon
lands. As a consequence, Rule B-42, as interpreted by the Blanchard court, appears to
be an unconstitutional taking of the seismic contractor’s property rights. Moreover, the

Blanchard result was never intended by the Commission.
The Commission staff has recently proposed a revision to Rule B-42. The offensive
language would be changed to read:
No entry shall be made by the permittee upon the lands upon which such
seismic operations are to be conducted without the permittee having first
given notice as provided in Ark. Code Ann. (1987) § 15-72-20313 to the
surface owner of the lands upon which such operations are to be conducted.
Meanwhile, an appeal from the Blanchard ruling is a virtual certainty.

Hal

e s Sa g a Fina l l y Ends a s t he Ark a nsa s
Cou rt o f Appea l s Af fi r ms Dismissa l
o f Ratepa yer s ’ Cl a im f o r Ref und

This space, a year ago, began with a discussion of the infamous Seeco v. Ha/es.14
As everyone knows, that case affirmed a record jury verdict in favor of a class of royalty
owners who convinced the jury that they were defrauded when Seeco and its utility affiliate,
Arkansas Western Gas Company, rewrote Contract 5915 in order to appease the Arkansas
Public Service Commission and implement a settlement entered into by Arkansas Western,
the Commission staff and the Arkansas Attorney General’s office.

13A statute generally requiring notice to be given to the surface owners prior to oil
and gas exploration.
14341 Ark. 673, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).
15A gas purchase contract with ridiculously high prices and take-or-pay obligations.
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Brandon v. Arkansas Western Gas Company16was a putative class action brought
in the Public Service Commission, seeking to certify a class of all of AW G’s rate payers
and claiming entitlement to refunds for the period prior to the reduction in the Contract 59

,

gas price. Like Hales Brandon involved multiple appeals. In a prior appeal,1
17 the Court
6
of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ attorneys were not entitled to attorneys’ fees for
representing the putative class under the common fund doctrine.18
After remand from that first appeal, the Public Service Commission dismissed
Brandon and Brooks’ complaint, holding that the settlement entered into by Arkansas
Western, the Commission staff and the Attorney General’s office19 was a res judicata bar
to further proceedings brought by individual rate payers. The Arkansas Court of Appeals
affirmed and the Hales saga officially ended on February 7, when the Supreme Court
denied the Plaintiffs’ petition for review.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Brandon opinion is that Judge Roaf,
writing for the Court of Appeals, managed to never mention Hales. Actually, Hales is
distinguishable. While the Attorney General clearly represents rate payers before the
Public Service Commission, royalty owners are not parties and therefore principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel cannot apply to bar subsequent royalty owner cases.

16 76 Ark. App. 2 0 1 , 61 S.W.3d 193 (2001).
17Brandon v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 67 Ark. App. 140, 992 S.W.2d
834 (1999).
18 Remarkably, that was not the end of the matter.
19It was conceded that the Attorney General represented the State of Arkansas and
all rate payers at that time.
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Ar k a ns a s Court o f Appea l s Af fi r ms Holding
Agai nst Co -Ten ant ’s Cl a im o f Adve r se Po ssessio

n

In the 1880's, Augustus and Martha Hopper acquired 120 acres of land in Yell
County. After Martha’s death, in 1947, one of their children, Lawrence Hopper, was in the
sole possession of the lands until his own death in 1975. During that time, Lawrence
exercised many incidents of ownership over the land, including possession, tax payments,
receiving rents and profits, constructing and maintaining improvements and receiving the
proceeds from oil and gas leases and timber sales. Lawrence’s son, John Hopper, then
possessed the land from 1979, when he retired from the Navy, until he discovered, in
1996, that record title was in his grandparents. He filed suit to quiet title against the rest
of the family.
The Yell County Chancery Court20 held that Hopper had not sustained his burden
of proving that his possession was adverse to his co-tenants and granted the other family
members’ counterclaim for partition of the property.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals

affirmed.21 The lesson here is simple. While it is possible for a co-tenant to adversely
possess property, mere possession and exercise of incidents of ownership is not enough.
There must be something which clearly telegraphs the adversity of the possessing cotenant’s intent to oust the rest of the family.

20 Honorable Van B. Taylor.
21 Hopper v. Daniel, 72 Ark. App. 344, 38 S.W.3d 370 (2001).
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Ok l ah o ma Cou r t o f Civil Appea l s Rul es Tha t Recei pt o f Roy al ti es Fr o m
A Unit W el l Doe s Not Constitute Adv er se Pos ses sio n o f Minera ls Under
Any T r a c t Other T ha n T ha t Upo n W hic h t he Unit W el l Is Physica lly Located .
As Professor Phillip Norvell taught us in a paper presented to this Institute in 2000,22
there are a lot of cases which tell what is not adverse possession of severed mineral
interests. Unfortunately, there are few, if any, holding what is. That said, many of us
would have guessed that receipt of royalties from a unit well for a period in excess of seven
years would constitute adverse possession of at least that class of mineral upon which the
royalties were paid. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals does not agree. In Cornelius

v. Moody Bible Institute o f Chicago,23 that court held that since the unit well was not
physically located on the tract in question, receipt of royalties was not adverse possession
of anything. Apparently, the court would have held otherwise had the well been physically
located on the tract.
We can only speculate whether the Arkansas court would adopt the Cornelius
decision. Indeed there is some reason to believe it would not.

In Post v. Tenneco Oil

Company,24the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a lessor’s entitlement to “free gas” from
wells located on the lease premises included off-premises unit wells. In Post, the Supreme
Court noted that the unit wells produced gas from under the lease premises and that
royalties were paid on a unit basis. In an earlier case, Brizzolara v. Powell,25 the Arkansas
22 Norvell, Adve r se Pos s es sio n a nd t he Sever ed Miner a l Est a t e in Ar k a nsa s ,
39th Annual Natural Resources Law Institute (2000)
2318 P.3d 1081 (Ok. Civ. App. 2001).
24 278 Ark. 527, 648 S.W.2d 42 (1983).
25 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949).
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Court held that adjoining production under a voluntary pooling agreement did not constitute
adverse possession of gas but offered the following dicta:
It is possible that the rule might be different if the neighboring well had been
drilled in accordance with a finding in the Oil and Gas Commission that such
a well would drain surrounding property, necessitating the formation of a
drilling unit; but that situation is not presented.26

Ar k a nsa s Cou rt o f Appea l s Ho l ds t hat Use o f Underground
Pipe line W ithout Rel a t ed Sur f a c e Acti viti es Is Not
Suf fi ciently Adv e r se to Cr ea t e A Presc riptive Ease ment
The W hortons and Needhams are neighbors. An Arkla distribution line crosses the
Needhams’ property. Many years before either family had acquired their properties, a
private gas line was laid from the Arkla line to the house now occupied by the Whortons.
The Needhams claimed they were unaware of that line. In 1999, Arkla determined that the
gas line to the Whorton house had developed a leak and cut off the gas. The Whortons,
claiming a prescriptive easement, tried to go upon the Needhams’ property and make
repairs.

When the Needhams refused, the W hortons sued, claiming they had a

prescriptive easement. The Logan County Chancery Judge27 ruled for the Needhams and
the Arkansas Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed.28 Mere transmission
of gas beneath the surface does not constitute the adverse possession necessary to create
a prescriptive easement. Only those activities which would call attention to the easement,
such as mowing and maintaining the right-of-way, will suffice.

26 Brizzolara v. Powell, supra, 214 Ark. at 873.
27 The Honorable Van B. Taylor.
28 Whorton v. Needham, No. CA 00-773 (Ark. App. 03/07/2001)
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Ar k a ns a s Leg isl at ur e Def ea t s Bil l Allo ca ting
Po s t -Pro duction Co st s W hil e Colora do Dec isio n
Demo nstrates W hy Suc h Leg isl a t io n is Neede d
A landmark case dealing with the deductibility of post-production costs in calculating
royalty is Mittlestaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,29 which holds that the lessee has a duty,
under its implied covenant to market, to cause gas to become a marketable product, free
of any cost to the lessor. Also, it is generally thought that, with or without specific language
in leases, the place of sale of gas upon which royalty is based, whether actual or
hypothetical, is at the wellhead where it is produced. Thus, any monies spent enhancing
the value of marketable gas by treating it, compressing it, and/or moving it to a market
where a better price is available may properly be shared, proportionately, with the lessor.
However, because of the uncertainty of Arkansas law on this issue,30 Arkansas gas
industry representatives petitioned the Arkansas legislature to clarify the matter. Fairly late
in the 2001 Legislative Session, Senator Mahoney introduced Senate Bill 813, which was
designed to statutorily adopt the Mittlestaedt doctrine and clarify that reasonable
transportation costs for sales away from the wellhead could be deducted, so as to obtain
a “net-back” wellhead price for the gas. The bill proved controversial. It finally passed the
Senate but was defeated in the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile, out in Denver, the Colorado Supreme Court proved why Senate Bill 813
was so desperately needed. In its case of Rogers v. Westerman,31 the Colorado court got

29 754 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998).
30Caused, in large part, by Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d
563 (1968).
31 29 P.3d. 887 (Colo. 2001).
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it about as wrong as it gets. W hile the court adopted the first marketable product rule of

Mittlestaedt, it declined to adopt the “at the wellhead” rule, without which the first
marketable product rule makes no sense.
Instead, the Colorado court held that the lessee’s duty to make a marketable
product included the cost of transporting the gas to a “commercial marketplace.” Worse,
the court held that a sale of the gas, regardless of whether it occurred in good faith, did not
necessarily establish a commercial market. Rather, that question, as well as the question
of when gas becomes a marketable product, is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
At this point, we should probably note that the sensational Bridenstine case32 was
a contort involving excessive post-production charges deducted from royalties.

It is

certainly imaginable that, under the Rogers decision, a producer could sell its produced
gas, pay the appropriate fraction of the proceeds to royalty owners, and still be held liable
in contort for royalties on the difference between the price gotten and that theoretically
available at some better “commercial marketplace.”

In the worst case scenario, if

contorting is permitted, a runaway jury might even award punitive damages. Senate Bill
813, or something like it, needs to be enacted in the next legislative session.

AOGC Implem ent s Mo st o f New l y Auth orized Inc re
in Oil a nd Ga s Co nser va t io n Asse ssment

ase

The AOGC is financed, in large part, by a severance tax known as the conservation
assessment. That tax has long been 25 mils (2.5¢) per barrel of oil,33 5 mils (.50) per MCF

32 Discussed supra.
33 A.C.A. § 51-71-107.
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of gas34 and 250 per 1,000 barrels of brine.35 In 2001, the Commission, strapped by
increased costs, lobbied the legislature for authority to increase these assessments. The
legislature responded favorably, enacting Act No. 1188 of 2001, which increased its
authority to tax oil from 25 mils (2.5¢) to 50 mils (5¢) per barrel, gas from 5 mils (.5¢) to 10
mils (1¢) per MCF and brine from 25¢ to 50¢ per 1,000 barrels.
The Commission staff then conducted a comprehensive review of the relative costs
of regulating these three industries, versus the conservation assessment paid by each.
That review led to the staff's conclusion that the brine industry was already paying at least
its share.

However, the staff suggested that the AOGC increase the conservation

assessments on oil and gas to the maximum amount permitted.
The Commission’s anguish was obvious as it discussed the implementation of its
increased authority to tax. Indeed, throughout 2001, only one other can contained more
worms.36 Commissioners appeared to be simultaneously pulled three ways: (1) the need
for increased revenues was obvious, indeed it was becoming desperate; (2) small South
Arkansas gas producers demanded no new taxes, at least none that they would have to
pay;37 (3) North Arkansas gas producers didn’t seem to mind the increase but were
unwilling to bear more than their proportionate share.
After three separate hearings, the Commission implemented most, but not all, of its

34 Id.
35 A.C.A. § 15-76-306(d).
36 Ducky Wucky, infra.
37 This is somewhat ironic. These folks and their predecessors have long been
responsible for more than their share of regulatory costs.
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taxing authority on oil and gas. Effective January 1,2002, the conservation assessment
was increased to 4.3¢ per barrel of oil and .9¢ per MCF of gas. No change was made in
the brine assessment.

New Ar k a nsa s Le g isl at

io n

Co nfir

ms

T ha t AOGC May Employ Pr iva t e Co unsel

In a 2000 appeal of a Circuit Court affirmance of a 1999 AOGC integration order,38
the appellants raised an interesting issue.

The original act creating the Commission

provided that legal representation would be by the Attorney General or, if he was not
available, the prosecuting attorney of any county in which a suit was pending. No mention
was made of private outside counsel. Thus, the appellants assigned as error the trial
court’s refusal to disqualify long-time AOGC counsel W illiam Wynne.

The Court of

Appeals dodged that bullet, stating that even if the Circuit Judge’s ruling was erroneous,
it was harmless error since other counsel in the case had made the identical arguments
advanced by Mr. Wynne.
This will not be a problem in the future because the Arkansas Legislature enacted
Act No. 1189 of 2001 which amended A.C.A. § 15-71-104 to read as follows:
15-71-104. Counsel for the commission.
(a)
(1) The Oil and Gas Commission may employ an attorney to
provide specialized professional services in matters requiring legal
representation.
(2) However, any contract for legal representation shall be subject to
approval by the Attorney General, who shall otherwise be attorney for the
commission.
(b) Any member of the commission or the secretary thereof shall
38
Lindquist & Moore v. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, et al., UNPUBLISHED,
No. CA 99-1306 (Ark. App. 05/31/2000)
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have power to administer oaths to any witness in any hearing, investigation,
or proceeding contemplated by this act or by any other law of this state
relating to the conservation of oil or gas.
History. Acts 1939, No. 105, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 53-104; Acts 2001, No.
1189, § 1.

T he W orm s Got Out o f the Ca n Ag a in a nd
Duck y W ucky May Ha ve Lef t the Bui ldi ng
The AOGC has a mixed mission. It is supposed to regulate the production of oil and
gas to both promote conservation (i.e. prevent waste) and protect correlative rights.39
Unfortunately, these objectives sometimes are in conflict. In the gas business there are
at least two commodities worthy of being conserved: gas and money. You can turn money
into gas and gas into money. Nevertheless, as we all know, these two currencies are not
always fungible with one another. The exchange rate between them is subject to wild
fluctuations. Both have a time value. The curves of those time values sometimes run in
opposite directions.
These variances occur on a case-by-case basis. Some producers are so cash flow
needy that every decrease in the price of gas must be compensated for by an increase in
production. At the other extreme are those who look at gas in the ground as money in the
bank, only better.

In between are those producers who would like to sell more gas

(particularly during periods of high prices) or, at least, not sell less gas as their wells
deplete.
Of course, correlative rights issues make all of this impossibly complex. Almost
every drilling unit is differently owned from units off-setting it. W orse, in many units,
39A.C.A. §§ 15-72-101-102
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individual wellbores are owned differently. Against this back-drop, the AOGC has once
again been asked to deal with the “I words.”40
The last time this happened this author felt compelled to devote an entire paper to
the resultant can of worms.41 You might remember Ducky W ucky.42 According to the late
AOGC chairman, Ned Price, fear of all suggestions of increased density was the equivalent
of screaming “the sky is falling” with each dropping acorn. Well, Ducky found relief in late
1995 in the form of an interim legislative committee which ordered the AOGC to stop
studying increased density until it (the committee) could look further into the matter. As far
as is known that committee never did. Its members have long been lost to term limits.
Nevertheless, the committee sent increased density into about a six year coma.
During those six years a couple of interesting things happened. First, as might be
expected, the Arkoma Basin became even more mature. It has become harder and harder
to find anything new, except in small, hard to find and harder to map reservoirs. Second,
for a wonderful eighteen months or so, the price was up. Way up! That set off a wave
of exploration in the south part of the Basin, which is much deeper structurally than the
“Fairway” along the Arkansas River.
The geology of this South Flank area is somewhat different from the Fairway. The

40 Increased well density.
in t h e

41Daily, Inc re as ed Dens ity f o r A r k an s as o r Yo u Ca n ’t Keep a Go o d W o r m Do w n
Ca n , 34th Annual Natural Resources Law Institute (1995).

42Wucky, a/k/a Lucky, was one of several barnyard residents led into mass panic by
Chicken Little in the children’s story named for the latter fowl. Little, a creature of limited
experience, had confused a falling acorn with Armageddon. In at least some versions of
the story, Little, W ucky and their companions were eaten by one Foxy Loxy, a/k/a Woxy,
which may explain W ucky’s recent absence from the scene.
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productive sandstones are Middle Atokan. They are deep water turbidites rather than
deltaic shelf deposits. The communication throughout these strata is tortuous, at best.
Also, permeability is frequently poor.

Finally, the proximity of the South Flank to the

upthrust Ouachita Mountain Range causes these Middle Atoka reservoirs to be busted up
with numerous thrust faults. Middle Atoka structure and isopach maps look like scrambled
eggs.
In recognition of these geologic distinctions the AOGC has begun to recognize that
South Flank units may need different well density rules. This has been done, case-bycase, in one of three ways:

1. Make it easier to establish separation. Existing rules do not prohibit second
and subsequent wells within units. They prohibit multiple wells within the same “common
source of supply” within any single unit. Thus, there can always be as many wells as there
are geologic formations producing within the unit and, if one of those is interrupted by a
barrier, such as a fault, as many more wells as there are barriers. The only trouble is that
you have to prove the separation of the reservoir after spending the money to drill your
well. In two South Flank fields, Chismville and Booneville, the AOGC has agreed that one
Middle Atoka reservioir, the Upper Borum, is so irregularly deposited and fractured that
each new well completed in that formation is presumed to be in a separate common source
of supply from any other Upper Borum wells within the unit.43

2. Reduce the size of the box. Almost all Arkoma Basin units are 640 acre regular
governmental sections. However, in two instances, the AOGC has somewhat reluctantly

43 AOGC Order Reference Nos. 93-94 and 86-2001-05, respectively.
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agreed to the creation of sub-units within existing units for Middle Atoka wells. In the first
of these Howard Bagby convinced the Commission to downsize one unit within the
Chismville Field to 80 acre sub-units.44 The downsizing order applies only to two Middle
Atoka formations.45 To honor the vested rights of royalty owners all royalties from all subunit wells continue to be paid across the original 676.71 acre unit.
The second successful downsizing did not occur until October 2001. That was a
rehearing of the previously stalemated application of Vastar Resources, Inc., to reduce unit
size for a formation called the “Upper Hartford ‘A ’” in Mansfield Field to 160 acres. Again,
the proposal was to create sub-units and continue to pay royalties based upon the original
units of approximately 640 acres.46
That application proved extremely controversial. It was first heard in September with
Commissioners W eiser and Carmel absent. At the end of that day there was a tie vote,
Commissioner W hite abstaining.

Vastar requested a rehearing.

That time, with all

Commissioners participating, it passed, but by only one vote, and was significantly limited
in scope.47
3. Stripper Wells Should Not Count. Dorsey Ryan has long cried for an exception
to what he calls the “rule of one.” That exception would classify marginal wells as “stripper”
wells and permit them to produce without preempting the unit allowable for their productive

44 The unit is Section 7, Township 6 North, Range 27 W est, Logan County. The
case is AOGC Order Reference No. 53-95.
45 Basham (970' to 1,605') and Nichols (1,605' to 2,400').
46 AOGC Order Reference No. 163-2001-10.
47 One year or 10 wells, whichever comes first.
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reservoirs. Dorsey has filed such an application at lease twice before on behalf of Hanna
Oil and Gas Company. In February, 2002, Dorsey filed another such application, this time
for Hanna and five other companies.48 The application defines a “stripper” well as a well
incapable of producing in excess of 60 MCF per day, whose production cannot reasonably
be improved. It requests that the stripper be permitted to produce without affecting the unit
production allowable for any other unit well.
Dorsey’s current application is very much like the ones which have failed in the
past, with one important exception. The latest application is limited to the South Flank of
the Basin.49 As of the publication date for this paper no opposition50 had surfaced. The
application is scheduled to be heard the day before this paper is scheduled to be
presented. It should be interesting.

48 Hogback Exploration, Inc., Klabzuba Oil & Gas, Providence Exploration &
Production, Inc., Freedom Energy Inc. and XTO Energy, Inc.
49 Chismville, Gragg, Slaytonville, Booneville, Brock Creek, Delaware, Excelsior,
Fletcher Creek, Mansfield, Pine Ridge, Waveland and W itcherville Fields.
50 Ducky W ucky or otherwise.
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